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The vast majority of the Court of International Trade's cases
involve challenges to federal government actions involving inter-
national trade. These cases are generally initiated by importers,
foreign exporters, or members of a domestic manufacturing indus-
try affected by foreign competition. These trade disputes are often
important to foreign governments as well as to foreign industries,
and foreign governments sometimes seek relief on behalf of their
own industries, or to redress their own perceived injury. In certain
limited cases, there are statutes that provide the Court of Interna-
tional Trade with jurisdiction to entertain foreign governments'
complaints concerning actions taken by the Executive Branch.
However, this occurs pursuant to the constitutional backdrop that
the President "shall receive Ambassadors and other public Minis-
ters"1 and, thus, he alone conducts the foreign affairs of the United
States. Nevertheless, in a case of first impression before any court,
the Court of International Trade held that a foreign government
may sue the United States in the United States' own courts pursu-
ant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),2 even though no
statute explicitly allows such a lawsuit to proceed.3
In this Article, I will discuss the principles of sovereign immu-
nity that underpin all courts' jurisdiction to hear claims against the
government and the Court of International Trade's jurisdiction to
hear APA cases. I will then apply these basic principles to the au-
* Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division. The opinions
expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the po-
sition of the Department of Justice or any other United States agency. The author
would like to thank Jeanne E. Davidson of the Department of Justice for her guid-
ance in developing this paper.
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000) [hereinafter APA].
3 See Tembec, Inc. v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1321-23 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2006) (holding that the provincial governments of Canada were entitled to
sue the United States in the Court of International Trade).
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thority of U.S. courts to entertain claims brought by foreign gov-
ernments against the United States, addressing, in particular, the
Court of International Trade's recent decision in Tembec.
In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court and the Federal Cir-
cuit have made clear that the courts may only entertain claims
against the government in cases where there is an explicit, statu-
tory waiver of sovereign immunity. Likewise, Congress intended
that the Court of International Trade possess jurisdiction to enter-
tain a discrete subset of APA claims. Specifically, Congress pro-
vided the Court of International Trade with exclusive subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to entertain actions against the government arising
from any law of the United States that provides for: (1) revenue
upon imports and tonnage; (2) duties and fees; (3) embargoes or
other quantitative restrictions; or (4) administration and enforce-
ment of certain matters for which the court possesses jurisdiction.4
In these actions, the APA provides the cause of action against the
government.
Pursuant to this constitutional and statutory backdrop, I will
discuss how the absence of a specific waiver of sovereign immu-
nity for foreign governments to sue the United States under the
APA precludes the courts from "receiving ambassadors" by ac-
cepting foreign sovereigns' complaints. As a result, if a foreign
government disagrees with the actions of the Executive Branch,
that sovereign should complain to the President, not to the courts.
1. BACKGROUND
1.1. Sovereign Immunity Principles
The ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity holds the govern-
ment immune from all lawsuits unless the government explicitly
waives its immunity. Waivers of sovereign immunity must be "ex-
pressed in statutory text." 5 Such waivers must be "unequivocally
expressed" 6 in statutory text and "not enlarge[d] ... beyond what
the language requires." 7 "A statute's legislative history cannot
4 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(i)(1)-(4) (2000).
5 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).
6 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992) (quoting Irwin
v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)).
7 Id. at 35 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983)).
[Vol. 28:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss1/4
SUING THE U.S. UNDER THE APA
supply a waiver that does not appear clearly in any statutory
text."8 In addition, any "limitations and conditions upon which
the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and
exceptions thereto are not to be implied." 9 Even if there has been
some waiver of immunity, the Government is not subject to mone-
tary liability unless the waiver unequivocally expresses consent to
the specific claims at issue.10
As stated in Lane:
"[S]overeign immunity places the Federal Government on
an entirely different footing than private parties," and if
there exists a "plausible" reading of a statutory waiver that
excludes such liability, the waiver is equivocal and does
not waive immunity from this form of relief.12 In sum, the
"scope" of a "waiver of the Government's sovereign im-
munity will be strictly construed.., in favor of the sover-
eign."13
Lastly, only Congress may waive sovereign immunity. Neither
the Executive Branch nor the Judicial Branch may effect a waiver
through the exercise of their respective powers.' 4 The Executive
8 Lane, 518 U.S. at 192.
9 Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981) (quoting Soriano v. United
States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957)).
10 See Lane, 518 U.S. at 192 ("To sustain a claim that the Government is liable
for awards of monetary damages, the waiver of sovereign immunity must extend
unambiguously to such monetary claims."); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486
(1994) (declining to extend actions against officers to federal agencies); see also
Yancheng Baolong Biochemical Products Co. v. United States, 406 F.3d 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to order the government to
pay attorney fees as a contempt sanction because there was no waiver of sover-
eign immunity for such an award); Novacor Chemicals, Inc. v. United States, 171
F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("We must strictly construe the statute, for we may
not imply a waiver."); RHI Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1459, 1461
(Fed. Cir. 1998) ("Waivers of sovereign immunity must be explicit, and cannot be
implied."); NEC Corp. v. United States, 806 F.2d 247, 249 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The
terms of the government's consent to be sued in any particular court define that
court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.").
11 Lane, 518 U.S. at 196.
12 See Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 37 (" [T]he 'unequivocal expression' of elimi-
nation of sovereign immunity that we insist upon is an expression in statutory
text [and]... [i]f clarity does not exist there, it cannot be supplied by a committee
report.").
13 Lane, 518 U.S. at 192.
14 See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424-34 (1990) (explain-
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Branch's Article II powers and the Judicial Branch's Article III
powers are "limited by a valid reservation of congressional control
over funds in the Treasury."15 The Supreme Court's strict con-
struction of statutory waivers of immunity thus ensures that "pub-
lic funds will be spent [only] according to the letter of the difficult
judgments reached by Congress as to the common good ...."16
1.2. The Administrative Procedure Act
Congress enacted the APA in 1946 to foster an efficient and or-
ganized means for government agencies to make rules and to "ad-
judicate," or to make determinations concerning requests by the
public for specific agency actions.17 In the rulemaking context, the
APA provides for notice and comment to interested parties, as well
as the general public.18 In the adjudicating context, the APA simi-
larly provides procedures for agencies to follow in reaching deci-
sions with respect to individuals seeking relief before the agency. 19
[T]he entire act is based upon [the] dichotomy between rule
making and adjudication.... Rule making.., is essentially
ing that in the absence of appropriation by an act of Congress, neither the execu-
tive pardon power nor the equitable doctrine of estoppel may override the Ap-
propriations Clause of the Constitution to secure payouts from the Treasury)
[hereinafter "OPM"]; United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 502 (1940) ("It is not our
right to extend the waiver of sovereign immunity more broadly than has been di-
rected by the Congress.").
15 OPM, 496 U.S. at 425; See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall
be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
Law ....").
16 See OPM, 496 U.S. at 428.
17 See generally ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURE ACT § 1(c), at 12-16 (1947) (distinguishing "adjudication" from "rulemak-
ing" on the grounds that the former involves assessing whether past conduct was
unlawful in determining an individual's right to benefits under existing law)
[hereinafter "AG Manual"]. The Supreme Court has noted that the Attorney Gen-
eral's Manual on the APA is "a document whose reasoning we have often found
persuasive...." Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 63-64 (2004).
18 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (stipulating that this section applies to everyone as
long as the following matters are not involved: matters relating to military or for-
eign affairs functions in the United States, agency management or personnel, pub-
lic property, loans, grants, benefits and contracts).
19 Id. § 554 (2000) ("This section applies, according to the provisions thereof,
in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record
after opportunity for an agency hearing, except to the extent that [certain matters
are] involved.").
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legislative in nature, not only because it operates in the fu-
ture but also because it is primarily concerned with policy
considerations .... Typically, the issues relate not to the
evidentiary facts, as to which the veracity and demeanor of
witnesses would often be important, but rather to the pol-
icy-making conclusions to be drawn from the facts ....
Conversely, adjudication is concerned with the determina-
tion of past and present rights and liabilities .... In such
proceedings, the issues of fact are often sharply contro-
verted. 20
The APA also provides for judicial review of agency actions.
Specifically, the APA mandates that "[algency action made re-
viewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no
other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review." 21
The APA identifies the scopes and standards of review for
courts to apply in adjudicatory challenges to agency actions:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and de-
termine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action. The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unrea-
sonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or oth-
erwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limi-
20 Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting
AG Manual, supra note 17, at 14-15).
21 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
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tations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject
to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed
on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute;
or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall re-
view the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party,
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial er-
ror.'2
Only "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute" may initiate an APA action.
23
This provision further mandates that "[n]othing herein ... (2) con-
fers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent
to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought."24
The APA defines "person" as "an individual, partnership, corpora-
tion, association, or public or private organization other than an
agency."25
1.3. Court of International Trade Review in Section 1581(i) Cases
The Court of International Trade has exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the cases identified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581 to 1584.
Section 1581, which identifies actions against the United States
over which the court has jurisdiction, is the relevant provision
here. Sections 1581(a) through 1581(h) identify specific agency de-
terminations issued pursuant to specific grants of statutory author-
ity.
22 Id. § 706.
23 Id. § 702.
24 Id.
25 Id. § 551(2).
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Section 1581(i) confers to the Court of International Trade sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over
any civil action commenced against the United States, its agen-
cies, or its officers, that arises out of any law of the United
States providing for- (1) revenue from imports or tonnage; (2)
tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of mer-
chandise for reasons other than the raising of revenue; (3) em-
bargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of
merchandise for reasons other than the protection of the public
health or safety; or (4) administration and enforcement with re-
spect to [certain] matters26
over which the court possesses jurisdiction.
Congress also identified parties that may bring a 1581(i) action;
in describing the standing requirement, the statute states, "[an ac-
tion] may be commenced in the court by any person adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of section
702 of title 5 [the APA standing provision]." 27
1.4. The Court Of International Trade's Statutory Standard and Scope
of Review in Section 1581(i) Cases
When Congress created the Court of International Trade in
1980, the legislature enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2640, which identities the
"[s]cope and standard of review" for all actions brought in that
court. With respect to matters initiated pursuant to section 1581(i),
the statute mandates that "the Court of International Trade shall
review the matter as provided in section 706 of title 5 [the APA
scope and standard of review]." 28 Likewise, Congress explicitly
referenced the APA standing statute in identifying the "[p]ersons
entitled to commence a civil action" in 28 U.S.C. § 2631: "Any civil
action of which the Court of International Trade has jurisdiction,
other than an action specified in subsections (a)-(h) of this section,
may be commenced in the court by any person adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of section 702 of
title 5 [the APA standing provision]." 29
26 28 U.S.C. §§ 1531(i)(1)-(4) (2000)
27 28 U.S.C. § 2631(i) (2000).
28 Id. § 2640(e).
29 Id. § 2631(i).
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The APA's all-inclusive scope and standard of review statute
encompasses many of the statutory standards of review employed
by the Court of International Trade in a host of matters challenging
governmental action.30 For example, the deferential substantial
evidence standard is applied in reviewing the agencies' factual
findings in challenges to antidumping and countervailing duty de-
terminations, 31 as well as to Department of Labor factual determi-
nations concerning eligibility of worker groups to apply for Trade
Adjustment Assistance.32 Likewise, the Court of International
Trade applies the "abuse of discretion" standard to certain agency
actions, including the Department of Commerce's verification pro-
cedures in antidumping duty proceedings, which the agency im-
plements on an "ad hoc" basis, 33 and the ultra vires standard to de-
terminations by the United States Trade Representative
("USTR").34
The statute specifying the standard and scope of review of the
Court of International Trade also identifies specific instances where
that court will apply the de novo standard.35 Section 706(2)(F) of
the APA permits de novo review in two situations: (1) "when the
action is adjudicatory in nature and the agency factfinding proce-
dures are inadequate," and (2) "when issues that were not before
the agency are raised in a proceeding to enforce nonadjudicatory
agency action." 36 Courts generally hold that agency fact finding
procedures are adequate where the agency follows applicable stat-
utes and regulations. 37
30 5 U.S.C. § 706.
31 19 U.S.C. §§ 1516a(b), 1581(c) (2000).
32 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581(d), 2395(b) (2000).
33 Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 117 F.3d 1386, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
34 Gilda Indus. v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1369 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2005), affd in relevant part, 446 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
35 28 U.S.C. § 2640(a) (2000).
36 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
37 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S.
519, 543-44 (1978) (finding that the statutory process for a nuclear power plant li-
censing hearing did not violate due process rights); Upjohn Mfg. v. Schweiker, 681
F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1982) (holding that de novo review of Food and Drug Ad-
ministration drug approval decisions is unavailable where an agency followed
statutory procedures).
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1.5. Tembec
In Tembec, the Court of International Trade concluded that for-
eign governments fall within the class of plaintiffs Congress in-
tended to allow to bring suit against the United States under the
APA.38 Tembec involved the administration of antidumping and
countervailing duty laws on softwood lumber from Canada. The
antidumping and countervailing duty laws are remedial measures
that provide relief to domestic manufacturers by imposing duties
upon imports of competitive products that are either sold in the
United States at less than fair value or are unfairly subsidized by
the government of the exporting country.39 Imposing these duties
is a multi-step process. Upon receipt of a petition by a domestic
industry alleging dumping or subsidization of competitive mer-
chandise from a specific country or countries, the Department of
Commerce conducts an investigation to determine whether these
imports are being sold at less than fair value or are being subsi-
dized by the government of the exporting country. The second
step involves the International Trade Commission ("ITC"). If
Commerce determines that dumping or subsidization is occurring,
the ITC investigates whether the domestic industry is materially
injured or threatened with material injury as a result of the dump-
ing or subsidization. If the ITC's injury determination is affirma-
tive, Commerce then issues an antidumping or countervailing duty
order. Accordingly, any antidumping or countervailing duty order
must be supported by a dumping or subsidization determination
as well as an ITC injury or threat of injury determination.
Antidumping and countervailing duty determinations may be
reviewed by the Court of International Trade, 40 and when the order
involves Canadian or Mexican goods, by a North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") binational panel.41 Governments of
exporting countries may complain to the World Trade Organiza-
tion ("WTO").42 In Tembec, the Canadian government (as well as
38 Tembec, Inc. v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1321-23 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2006).
39 See 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673.
40 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b).
41 Id. § 1516a(g).
42 See section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act [hereinafter "sec-
tion 129"] 19 U.S.C. § 3538 (2000) (providing a mechanism for the United States to
exercise its discretion in complying with WTO rulings and decisions).
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other Canadian interests) challenged the ITC's threat of injury de-
termination before a NAFTA binational panel. At the same time,
the Canadian government initiated a WTO challenge to the same
determination. Before the NAFTA proceeding was completed, the
WTO issued recommendations concerning the means by which the
United States may comply with its WTO obligations. The govern-
ment implemented those recommendations by issuing a new threat
of injury determination pursuant to section 129 of the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act ("section 129") and giving this new deter-
mination domestic legal effect. This new ITC determination pro-
vided support for the antidumping and countervailing duty or-
ders, rendering the NAFTA binational challenge to the ITC's
original determination moot.
The Canadian government sued the United States in the Court
of International Trade, maintaining that the USTR's decision to
give domestic legal effect to the ITC's new determination was ultra
vires.
In addressing the government's motion to dismiss, the court
concluded that it could hear foreign governments' complaints
against the United States. The court first noted that the "APA de-
fines 'person' as 'an individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or public or private organization other than an agency."' 43
Notwithstanding the rule that waivers of sovereign immunity
must be strictly construed, may not be implied, and must be un-
equivocally stated in statutory text, the court concluded that its
[d]ecision is not to be reached by a strict construction of the
words of the Act, nor by the application of artificial canons
of construction. On the contrary, we are to read the statu-
tory language in its ordinary and natural sense, and if
doubts remain, resolve them in the light, not only of the
policy intended to be served by the enactment, but, as well,
by all other available aids to construction.44
Applying this expansive approach to the waiver of sovereign
immunity, the court concluded that Congress intended to allow
foreign governments to challenge Executive Branch decisions in
domestic courts. The court noted various cases, which did not in-
43 Tembec, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(2)).
44 Id. (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604-05 (1941)).
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volve suits against the United States by a foreign government,
where courts excluded governments from the definition of a "per-
son."45 Nevertheless the court here included foreign governments
in "person."
46
Relying upon Stone and Neal-Cooper, two Freedom of Informa-
tion Act ("FOIA") cases where the courts concluded that informa-
tion obtained from a foreign government was discoverable in FOIA
actions brought by private entities, the court here decided that
cases including foreign governments as "persons" implied that for-
eign sovereign possess the right to sue the United States under the
APA.
The court further relied upon statutes limited to certain classes
of international trade cases for which foreign governments are
statutorily granted the right to sue, to conclude that the APA defi-
nition of "person," mandated by section 2631(i), includes foreign
governments.47 The court thus held that "interested parties" in an-
tidumping and countervailing duty cases should be treated as
"persons" for the purpose of the APA.48
2. DISCUSSION
2.1. Section 1581(i) Cases Are APA Cases
The only causes of action available in matters initiated pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) either stem from the APA or from a non-
statutory cause of action predicated upon a challenge to allegedly
unconstitutional governmental action.
45 See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (holding that a
domestic state is not a person under the federal civil rights statute [42 U.S.C. §
1983]); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 379 (1998) ("It is clear that Paraguay is not
authorized to bring suit under § 1983. Paraguay is not a 'person' as that term is
used in § 1983."); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82,
96 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that foreign governments "are not 'persons' protected
by the Fifth Amendment").
46 Tembec, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1321-23 (citing Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434
U.S. 308, 320 (1978); See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 776
(D.D.C. 1974)) ("A foreign government or an instrumentality thereof appears to be
a 'public or private' organization within the terms of the FOJA.").
47 Tembec, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(B); 28 U.S.C. §
2631).
48 See id. ("'Interested party' and 'person' have an identical meaning within
the statute.").
2007]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. 1. Int'l Econ. L.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
which reviews Court of International Trade judgments, recently is-
sued an en banc opinion that clarified the source of the court's au-
thority in section 1581(i) cases with respect to a challenge to a
presidential determination not to provide import relief to a domes-
tic industry pursuant to the United States-China Relations Act of
2000.49 Section 421 of this statute provides, among other things, a
mechanism for the President to impose trade restrictions upon
surges of Chinese imports that cause market disruption in the
United States. In Motion Systems Corp. v. Bush,50 the Court of Ap-
peals, sitting en banc, addressed whether a domestic producer
could sue the President under section 1581(i) to challenge his deci-
sion not to impose trade restrictions on competing Chinese prod-
ucts. The court implicitly recognized two primary characteristics
of sections 421 and 1581(i). First, section 421 contains no express
provision for judicial review. Second, the subject matter of the sec-
tion 421 claim in Motion Systems fell within the jurisdiction of the
Court of International Trade under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(2).51 Pursu-
ant to this backdrop- namely the lack of an express statute provid-
ing for judicial review of the specific subject matter that falls under
section 1581(i)- the en banc court explained that, in cases where
there "is no explicit statutory cause of action[,] ... [a plaintiff] has
only two potential sources for relief: (1) the Administrative Proce-
dure Act... or (2) some form of non[-]statutory review." 52
Accordingly, any section 1581(i) case must be treated by the
Court of International Trade exactly as a district court would treat
an APA claim where the plaintiff alleges "final agency action for
which there is no other adequate remedy in a court [which the
APA renders] subject to judicial review."5 3
49 United States-China Relations Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. § 2451 (2000) (adding
§ 421 to the Trade Act of 1974).
50 See Motion Sys Corp. v. Bush, 437 F.3d 1356, 1359-62 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en
banc), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 69 (2006) ("The President's actions cannot be chal-
lenged because judicial review is unavailable when a statute allegedly violated
itself commits a decision to the discretion of the President.").
51 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(2) (2000) (providing for exclusive review by the Court
of International Trade for "tariffs, duties, fees, or other taxes on the importation of
merchandise for reasons other than the raising of revenue").
52 Motion Sys, 437 F.3d at 1359. See also Shinyei Corp. v. United States, 355
F.3d 1297, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that a section 1581(i) case's "cause of action
is based in the [APA] pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702").
53 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000).
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2.2. The APA Does Not Allow Foreign Governments to Bypass the
Executive in Favor of the Judiciary
2.2.1. Monaco v. Mississippi: Ordinary sovereign immunity
principles apply to actions brought by foreign governments
against governmental defendant
The APA does not allow foreign governments to seek redress
for the actions of the United States before the courts. The courts
have long looked to the status of individual plaintiffs in determin-
ing whether the plaintiff possesses a right to initiate an action. This
general rule is even more pronounced when the government is be-
ing sued, and the courts are asked to find a waiver of sovereign
immunity.
Foreign sovereign plaintiffs enjoy broad immunity from suit in
the U.S. courts pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act.54 There must likewise be an express waiver of the United
States' sovereign immunity so as to allow foreign sovereigns to sue
the government in the United States' own courts.
The principle that foreign sovereigns must be treated differ-
ently from any other class of plaintiff is expressed in the Supreme
Court's seminal decision in Monaco v. Mississippi.55 In that case, the
Government of Monaco sued the State of Mississippi to recover
upon bonds that were in default. The Court identified the question
as whether it has "jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought by a for-
eign State against a State without her consent."5 6 Monaco's argu-
ment relied upon the constitutional provision that "the judicial
power shall extend to controversies 'between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects' . . . and that in
cases 'in which a State shall be Party[,]' this Court shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction."57 The Court, however, explained that while the
Constitution does contain similar language extending jurisdiction
"to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party,"
58
these provisions did not waive the federal government's sovereign
54 28 U.S.C. § 1602-11 (2000).
55 Monaco v. Miss., 292 U.S. 313, 325 (1934).
56 Id. at 320.
57 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2).
58 Id. at 321 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2).
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immunity,59 After drawing this analogy to the federal govern-
ment's sovereign immunity, the Court noted that "the judicial
power does not extend to it if the suit is sought to be prosecuted
against a State, without her consent, by one of her own citizens." 60
Pursuant to this reasoning, the Court held that sovereign immunity
bars action by a foreign government against a state government,
absent consent by the state government.
61
In so holding, the Court recognized that each of a number of
different classes of cases, including suits against a state "by a for-
eign state... has its characteristic aspect, from the standpoint of
the effect, upon sovereign immunity from suits, which has been
produced by the constitutional scheme." 62 The Court also noted
that this prohibition upon actions by foreign governments against
governmental defendants did not extend to suits initiated against
private defendants. 63
In sum, the Monaco holding makes it clear that foreign govern-
ments occupy a wholly different sphere than ordinary litigants
with respect to sovereign immunity. Specifically, not only must
there be a waiver of sovereign immunity contained in a statute for
a court to possess jurisdiction to entertain a certain type of case,
this waiver should also specifically confer to foreign sovereigns the
ability to sue the government.
2.2.2. The APA provides no right of action to foreign governments
Applied to the question of whether Congress has waived sov-
ereign immunity for foreign governments to sue the United States,
the basic principles of sovereign immunity indicate that there is no
waiver, given that the APA's definition of a "person" who may ini-
tiate an action does not expressly include a foreign government
pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702.
Specifically, the APA defines "person" to "include[ ] an indi-
59 See id. ("[T]here is no express provision that the United States may not be
sued in the absence of consent" and that "by reason of the established doctrine of
the immunity of the sovereign from suit except upon consent, the [Constitution]
does not authorize the maintenance of suits against the United States.").
60 Id. at 322.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 328.
63 Id. at 324, n.2 ("There is no question but that foreign States may sue private
parties in the federal courts.").
[Vol. 28:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol28/iss1/4
SUING THE U.S. UNDER THE APA
vidual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private
organization other than an agency." 64 The definition does not
identify foreign governments as parties entitled to sue the govern-
ment. Thus, the general requirement that a waiver of sovereign
immunity must be unequivocally contained in statutory text is not
met, which precludes APA review of a foreign government's com-
plaint.65
As previously noted, the only cases that address the APA's
definition of "person" with respect to foreign governments involve
FOIA actions by private parties seeking information from the gov-
ernment. As none of these cases involved foreign governments as
a party, they do not conduct a sovereign immunity analysis with
respect to foreign governments.
One court has held that a foreign government is a "person"
under section 551(2) for the purpose of the FOIA exception that
protects "trade secrets and commercial or financial information ob-
tained from a person and privileged or confidential" information
from disclosure.66 In Stone, the plaintiff sought disclosure of the
terms of a financing arrangement between the Export-Import Bank
and the Bank for Foreign Trade, a bank owned by the Soviet gov-
ernment. 67 The plaintiff alleged that the arrangements were not
protected because the information requested was not "obtained
from a person" within the meaning of FOIA. The court agreed that
the FOIA exception to "§ 552(b)(4) (2000) is not limited to protect-
ing information obtained only from American citizens or organiza-
tions, and therefore reject[ed] plaintiff's argument that information
obtained from the Bank for Foreign Trade is not information ob-
tained 'from a person' within the meaning of § 552(b)(4)."68
Additionally, in a so-called "reverse FOIA" case, a district court
denied a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to prevent
disclosure of information concerning certain imports to the Mexi-
64 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (2000).
65 See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) ("A waiver of the Federal Gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity must be unequivocally expressed in statutory
text.., and will not be implied.").
66 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2000).
67 See Stone v. Exp.-Imp. Bank of U.S., 552 F.2d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1977) (ex-
plaining that the plaintiff's argument rested on an absence of legislative history
"expressly embracing" an intent to protect only American citizens and busi-
nesses).
68 Id. at 137.
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can government, noting that Mexico could be considered a "per-
son" for FOIA purposes.69 In that case, the plaintiff had sought to
prevent disclosure of documents pursuant to an informal informa-
tion-sharing agreement between the Customs Service and the
Mexican government, alleging that the disclosure violated a crimi-
nal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, which prohibits certain disclosures by
government officials. The court preliminarily held that the disclo-
sures could be made public pursuant to FOIA, noting that a possi-
ble defense to an 18 U.S.C. § 1905 criminal prosecution would be
that the Mexican government, which was not a party to that case,
could be considered a "person" under FOIA. In contrast, another
district court took a different approach in defining "person" pur-
suant to the APA and concluded that foreign governments should
not be considered "persons" entitled to sue the government under
FOIA.70 In Doherty v. U.S. Department of Justice, the plaintiff was an
Irish Republican Army member convicted of murder in the United
Kingdom who filed a FOIA request with the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation ("FBI") as part of his defense against extradition. The
court concluded that Doherty was entitled to challenge the FBI's
denial of his FOIA request as a "person" pursuant to section 551(2).
However, the court drew from FOIA's legislative history to deter-
mine that foreign governments should not be included within the
definition of "person" for FOIA purposes and explained that the
precedent set in Neil-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger "goes beyond the
plain meaning of the statute and which this Court does not accept
as correctly decided." 71 The court provided an example where, the
Soviet government sought information, but "the KGB is not a 'per-
son'" who could file a FOIA request with the FBI.72
Other cases where foreign governments were plaintiffs in U.S.
courts did not involve actions against the government. Pfizer, Inc.
69 See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 776 (D.D.C. 1974)
(pointing out that "[a] foreign government or an instrumentality... appear[s] to
be a 'public or private organization' within the terms of the Act," and that this
view is supported by Customs Regulations which "contemplate requests from
foreign governments" in implementing disclosure policies under the Act).
70 See Doherty v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 596 F. Supp. 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(noting that Congress "provided no restrictive definition of the term 'person"' to
alter the original definition in the APA).
71 Id. at 427 n.4.
72 Id. at 428.
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v. Government of India 73 held that foreign sovereigns are "persons"
entitled to sue private defendants for antitrust violations. There,
the Government of India, as a customer, alleged injury due to price
fixing of antibiotic drugs. The Court noted that the applicable
definition of "persons" included "corporations and associations"
formed under domestic and foreign laws.74 The Court then ana-
lyzed whether India could sue, "[iln light of the law's expansive
remedial purpose."75 In taking a broad view of the courts' antitrust
jurisdiction, "the Court [did] not take[] a technical or semantic ap-
proach in determining who is a 'person' entitled to sue for treble
damages." 76
3. TEMBEC WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
Tembec, by failing to apply the correct sovereign immunity
analysis, erroneously held that foreign governments may sue the
United States under the APA.77 Moreover, the court erred by bas-
ing its construction of the APA on a statute limited by its own
terms to antidumping and countervailing duty proceedings before
the Department of Commerce and the ITC.78
As a preliminary matter, applying general sovereign immunity
principles to the question of whether foreign sovereigns may sue
the United States under the APA does not result in a waiver of
immunity. Pursuant to Monaco and Lane, courts must conduct a
sovereign immunity analysis focusing on whether there is an ex-
plicit waiver of sovereign immunity contained in statutory text that
allows a foreign government to sue the United States. The Court's
standing statute (which references the APA's standing statute), the
73 Pfizer Inc. v. Gov't of India, 434 U.S. 308, 318-19 (1978) ("This Court has
long recognized the rule that a foreign nation is generally entitled to prosecute
any civil claim in the courts of the United States upon the same basis as a domes-
tic corporation or individual might do.").
74 Id. at 312 n.9.
75 Id. at 314.
76 Id.
77 Tembec, Inc. v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1321-23 (Ct. Int'l Trade
2006).
78 The comprehensive settlement of the Canadian lumber dispute entered
into force on October 12, 2006. The agreement provides the Canadian parties with
all of the relief requested in their complaints. However, the Court of International
Trade issued a final judgment in Tembec on October 13, 2006. Tembec, Inc. v.
United States, slip op. 06-152 (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 13, 2006). At this time, notices of
appeal have been filed, and certain post-judgment motions remain pending.
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APA's standing statute (which references the APA's definition of
"person"), and the APA's definition of "person," do not identify
foreign governments as parties allowed to sue the United States
and, thus, there has been no waiver of immunity "unequivocally
expressed in statutory text."
79
Moreover, the Federal Circuit's approach in Motion Systems
would preclude the finding of a waiver of sovereign immunity. In
Motion Systems, the court focused on whether the courts possessed
jurisdiction over the President of the United States pursuant to the
APA. The court followed clear and unambiguous precedent to de-
termine that the identity of the defendant was dispositive in ad-
dressing whether there was a waiver.80 Likewise, under Monaco,
this approach should govern with respect to the identity of the
plaintiff.
No other authority relied upon by the court overcomes this ab-
sence of waiver. Neither of the two FOIA cases cited by the court
involved issues as to whether a foreign sovereign could sue the
United States or even whether a foreign sovereign could file a
FOIA request with an agency.81 Likewise, the court acknowledged
the existence of only one case that addressed, albeit in dicta, the is-
sue of whether a foreign government could actually exercise any
rights under FOIA.82
The other cases likewise did not find, or even imply, a waiver
of sovereign immunity. Pfizer held simply that a foreign govern-
ment as a customer of a defendant may sue that private defendant
in United States court for antitrust violations. This clearly follows
the Supreme Court's earlier teaching that "[t]here is no question
but that foreign States may sue private parties in the federal
courts."
83
79 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic Vil-
lage, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 37 (1992)).
80 Motion Sys. Corp. v. Bush, 437 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
81 See Stone v. Exp.-Imp. Bank of United States, 552 F.2d 132, 136 (5th Cir.
1977) (detailing whether exemptions to disclosure under FOIA are available to
foreign sovereigns in response to a FOIA suit filed by an American senator as to
information on a financial agreement with a U.S. bank); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v.
Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 776 (D.D.C. 1974) ("The Court must now decide
whether the request herein, made by or on behalf of the Mexican Government,
may be a request within the purview of the FOIA").
82 See Tembec 441. F. Supp. 2d at 1322.
83 Monaco v. Miss., 292 U.S. 313, 323 n.2 (1934).
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The court's expansion of 28 U.S.C. § 2631(c), which grants the
court jurisdiction to entertain specifically enumerated claims by
foreign governments involving antidumping and countervailing
duty determinations, to matters not identified in that subsection,
was similarly misplaced. The statutory definition of "interested
party" allows foreign governments to initiate actions only pursu-
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c). In such cases, "[a] civil action contesting
a determination listed in section 516A of the Tariff Act of 1930 may
be commenced in the Court of International Trade by any inter-
ested party who was a party to the proceeding in connection with
which the matter arose." 84 The definition of "interested party"
specifically includes "the government of a country in which such
merchandise is produced... ."85 However, section 2631(c) says
nothing about section 1581(i) cases. Rather, by its own terms, sec-
tion 2631(i) is limited to section 1581(c) cases. Indeed, if Congress
intended to waive sovereign immunity for foreign governments to
initiate section 1581(i) claims, it certainly could have done so, espe-
cially given that Congress provided such waiver for section 1581(c)
cases.
Furthermore, given the axiom that "[a] statute's legislative his-
tory cannot supply a waiver that does not appear clearly in any
statutory text,"86 the court's reliance upon the legislative history of
the Trade Act of 1980 cannot support a waiver.87 The language in
the legislative history was referring to the availability of section
1518(c) actions. Indeed, the preceding sentence referenced the
grant of "authority to the Court of International Trade to conduct
jury trials"; yet, this does not mean that all cases before the court
would be subject to trial de novo] before a jury.
Lastly, given the substantial immunities afforded to foreign
governments pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
("FSIA")88 and the Head of State doctrine, the Court of Interna-
tional Trade's holding in Tembec creates the absurd result that the
84 28 U.S.C. § 2631(c) (2000).
85 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(B) (2000).
86 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 186, 192 (1996).
87 See Tembec 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1323 (referring to H.R. REP. No. 96-1235, at 28,
as having "emphasiz[ed] Congressional intent to 'enlarge[] the class of persons
eligible to sue in civil actions in the Court of International Trade to include...
foreign governments.").
88 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (2000).
2007] 109
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
United States' courts are open to hear the complaints of foreign
sovereigns against the United States, while the courts are closed to
complaints against the very same foreign governments.
The FSIA codifies the traditional rule in international law (and
in domestic courts) that, except in certain circumstances irrelevant
to the Tembec decision, a foreign government may not be sued in
United States courts.8
9
Similarly, under the Head of State doctrine, foreign govern-
ment leaders may not be sued in domestic courts of the United
States. The doctrine of head-of-state immunity is rooted in the Su-
preme Court's decision in Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.90 Al-
though the Court in this case held that an armed ship of a friendly
state was exempt from United States jurisdiction, the decision
"came to be regarded as extending virtually absolute immunity to
foreign sovereigns." 91 Over time, the absolute immunity of the
state itself was diminished through the widespread acceptance by
states of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity -a theory re-
flected in the passage of the FSIA in 1976.
Nevertheless, courts have held that limitations upon immunity
contained in the FSIA do not apply to heads of state. As the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently explained:
The FSIA does not.., address the immunity of foreign
heads of states. The FSIA refers to foreign states, not their
leaders. The FSIA defines a foreign state to include a politi-
cal subdivision, agency or instrumentality of a foreign state
but makes no mention of heads of state. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
Because the FSIA does not apply to heads of states, the de-
cision concerning the immunity of foreign heads of states
remains vested where it was prior to 1976- with the Execu-
tive Branch. 92
Accordingly, the courts have concluded that the Head of State
doctrine continues to apply, as long as the Executive elects to con-
89 See id. § 1604 (2000) (noting that "a foreign state shall be immune from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided
in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.").
90 Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
91 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
92 Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2004) (citations and footnotes omit-
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fer immunity upon a foreign head of state. In such cases, the
courts must follow the Executive's directive. 93
The reasons for these long-standing prohibitions of suits
against foreign sovereigns in our domestic courts apply equally to
the question of whether foreign sovereigns may bring suit against
the United States in our domestic courts. In both instances, the is-
sues concern diplomacy and foreign affairs, not the adjudication of
any private rights based upon our domestic law. Yet, under the
decision in Tembec, a foreign government would be immune from
suits in our courts could sue the United States. In other words, in
the Tembec court's view, although Congress and the President have
affirmatively closed our courts to actions against foreign govern-
ments, they have opened our courts to actions by foreign govern-
ments against our own.
Indeed, the absurdity of allowing foreign governments to chal-
lenge Executive Branch decisions in U.S. courts is further propa-
gated by the procedures that foreign governments must follow to
request that the Executive Branch assert head-of-state immunity.
Specifically, the foreign government must petition the Department
of State, requesting that the Secretary of State recommend to the
Department of Justice that the foreign head of state be granted im-
munity. 94 The Department of Justice, as the agency responsible for
litigation involving the United States 95 and with authority to inter-
vene in any state or federal litigation that may involve the U.S. in-
terests, 96 then files a "suggestion of immunity" with the court. The
93 See, e.g., Ye, 383 F.3d at 626 n.8 ("[Aluthorities support the conclusive na-
ture of the Executive Branch's determination of immunity with regard to heads of
state."); Leutwyler v. Al Abdullah, 184 F. Supp. 2d 277, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (find-
ing that the Executive Branch's suggestion of immunity "is entitled to conclusive
deference"); First Am. Corp. v. Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp.
1107, 1119 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding that the court is bound by the Executive Branch's
suggestion of immunity); Alicog v. Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379, 382 (S.D. Tex.
1994) (holding that the court is bound by the Executive Branch's suggestion of
immunity), affd, 79 F.3d 1145 (5th Cir. 1996); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp.
128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) ("[T]he courts must defer to the Executive determina-
tion.").
94 See Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d
Cir. 1971) ("The State Department is to make [an immunity determination] in light
of the potential consequences to our own international position. Hence once the
State Department has ruled in a matter of this nature, the judiciary will not inter-
fere.").
95 28 U.S.C. § 515 (2000).
96 Id. § 517 provides, in relevant part, that "any officer of the Department of
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participation of foreign governments in litigation in the U.S. courts
thus implicates the Executive Branch's foreign affairs function. Ac-
cordingly, it would be absurd to allow the foreign government to
try an offense against the United States in its own courts.
97
In sum, the requirement that waivers of sovereign immunity be
explicitly contained in statutory text that is narrowly construed, in
conjunction with the Supreme Court's direction that lawsuits by
foreign governments against governmental defendants may only
proceed pursuant to a sovereign immunity analysis concerning
whether the defendant has consented to be sued by a foreign gov-
ernment, require that no APA right of action is available to foreign
governments. Rather than using the courts, a foreign govern-
ment's only option is to lobby the President and use diplomacy, as
the framers envisioned.
Justice[ ] may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United
States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of
the United States .....
97 To the best of our knowledge, Tembec is unique in that no other country
possesses laws that would allow the United States to sue the foreign government
in its own courts to challenge a sovereign (non-commercial) act of the foreign
country.
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